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LEGAL FORUM 
Discrimination and Human Rights: An Overview of 
Remedies 
Peter Kiely* 
Up until 10 August 1993, New Zealand's anti-discrimination law consisted of three statutes: 
The Employment Contracts Act 1991, The Race Relations Act 1971 and The Human Rights 
Commission Act 1977. There is also the Equal Pay Act 1972, which abolished gender 
based wage differentials in industrial awards but this is of less practical significance now 
and accordingly is not considered further. The Human Rights Act 1993 repeats and replaces 
the latter two Acts from 1 February 1994. The new Act provides protection from 
discrimination not only in the employment relationship, but also in such areas as the 
provisions of goods and services, accommodation, advertising and access to public places. 
In the employment context, the new Act mirrors the protection provided by the Employment 
Contracts Act and in some areas strengthens it. The two Acts stand alongside one another 
providing alternative routes for the aggrieved employee. 
The existence of two regimes means that an act of discrimination may result in proceedings 
under either statute with different remedies. It is therefore necessary to examine both 
statutes when considering remedies. 
The Human Ri2hts Act 1993 
Liability 
The new Act does not prohibit discrimination at large, nor discrimination in the popular 
sense. It is only specific types of behaviour in specific situations which are expressly 
prohibited. 
Section 22 of the Human Rights Act is the pivotal section on discrimination in employment 
matters. It provides: 
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Where an applicant for employment or an employee is qualified for work of any description, 
it shall be unlawful for an employer, or any person acting or purporting to act on behalf of 
an employer, -
(a) To refuse or omit to employ the applicant on work of that description which is available; 
or 
(b) To offer or afford the applicant or the employee less favourable terms of employment, 
conditions of work, superannuation or other fringe benefits and opportunities for training, 
promotion, and transfer than are made available to applicants or employees of the same or 
substantially similar capabilities employed in the same or substantially similar circumstances 
on work of that description; or 
(c) To terminate the employment of the employee, or subject that employee to any detriment, 
in circumstances in which the employment of other employees employed on work of that 
description would not be terminated, or in which other employees employed on work of that 
description would not be subjected to such detriment; or 
(d) To retire the employee, or to require or cause the employee to retire or resign; 
by reason of any of the prohibited grounds of discrimination. 
The prohibited grounds for discrimination are set out in Section 21 of the Act. They are: 
(i) Sex; 
(ii) Marital status; 
(iii) Religious belief; 
(iv) Ethical belief; 
(v) Colour; 
(vi) Race; 
(vii) Ethnic or national origins; 
(viii) Disability; 
(ix) Age; 
(x) Political opinion; 
(xi) Employment status; 
(xii) Family status; and 
(xiii) Sexual orientation. 
Thus the definition has two operative components. For discrimination to occur the 
employer must: 
(a) Make a decision in one of five broad areas, namely: 
(i) Recruitment; 
(ii) Offering terms and benefits; 
(iii) Promotion and transfer; 
(iv) Training; 
(v) Dismissal or retirement; and 
(b) That decision must be influenced by consideration of one of the thirteen factors listed in 
Section 21. 
In addition to Section 21, the Act provides for some further forms of discrimination. 
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Sexual and racial harassment 
Sexual and racial harassment are two further grounds on which the complaints of 
discrimination can be made. . Neither previously had a specific place in Human Rights 
Legislation, although such claims have been possible under the Employment Contracts Act. 
When a complaint is made, the behaviour complained of, being behaviour which the 
complainant finds unwelcome ·or offensive, must be either repeated, or of such a significant 
nature that it has a detrimental effect on the complainant in relation to his or her 
employment. 
Employers are liable for the behaviour of their employees (s.68). A complaint about the 
actions or behaviour of another employee is possible without first having to notify the 
employer in writing. This means that employers are liable for harassment of which they 
have no knowledge. Only the existence of an appropriate programme or procedure will 
afford protection against such claims. 
Sexual or racial harassment complaints may also be made in respect of an employer's 
customer or client. Any such complaint is to be made in writing to the employer who must 
enquire into the matter and take all practicable steps to prevent a repetition. If harassment 
does occur again, and nothing has been done to prevent it, the employer is deemed to have 
breached the Act. The affected employee may then lodge a complaint. 
The Act has extended the protection from sexual and racial harassment to the pre-
employment situation (s.62(3)(a) and s.63(2)(a). This is a significant extension to the 
protection given under the Employment Contracts Act and will prevent sexual/racial 
harassment in, for example, job interviews (ie before the employment contract is entered 
into). 
Indirect discrimination 
Discrimination need not be direct. A complaint may be made where a particular activity, 
although not intended to be discriminatory, may, nevertheless, be discriminatory in effect. 
For example, holding training sessions in the evening may mean employees with family 
responsibilities cannot attend. In the event of a complaint, the employer would need to be 
able to show why no other time was available. If an activity is discriminatory in its effect, 
it is unlawful unless there is a good reason for it. 
Remedies 
The Human Rights Commission has the power to investigate complaints for any possible 
breach of the Act. If the complaint is not settled in the preliminary stages civil proceedings 
may be brought at the suit of the Commission before the Complaints Review Tribunal. 
Where the Tribunal finds that the Act's discrimination provisions have been breached, it 
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may grant one or more of the following remedies (s.86): 
(a) A declaration that the defendant has committed a breach of the Act; 
(b) An order restraining the Defendant · from continuing to, or permitting others to, 
breach the Act; 
(c) Damages for: 
(i) Pecuniary loss suffered, and expenses reasonably incurred by the 
complainant as a result of the breach; · 
(ii) Loss of any benefit which the complainant might reasonably have been 
expected to obtain but for the breach; 
(iii) Humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to the feelings of the complainant; 
(d) An order that the defendant perform any acts with a view to redressing any loss or 
damage suffered by the complainant as a result of the breach; 
(e) A declaration that any contract entered into or performed in contravention of Part 
II of the Human Rights Act is an illegal contract; 
(f) Relief in accordance with the Illegal Contracts Act 1970 in respect of any contract 
to which the defendant and complainant are parties; or 
(g) Such other relief as the Tribunal thinks fit. 
Costs may be awarded whether or not any other remedy is granted. No award of damages, 
or indeed any remedy granted, may exceed the monetary limit of $200,000 set out in the 
District Courts Act 1947. In deciding what remedies (if any) to grant, the Tribunal must 
take into account the fact that a particular breach was unintentional or without negligence 
on the employer's part. 
The Employment Contracts Act 1991 
Liability 
The Labour Relations Act 1987 made the personal grievance procedures available to claims 
of discrimination for the first time. The Employment Contracts Act maintains that right. 
An employee may bring a personal grievance against his/her employer if the employee is 
discriminated against in terms of Section 28 of the Employment Contracts Act. 
As mentioned above, there is a significant overlap between personal grievance proceedings 
under Section 28 and complaints made under the Human Rights Act. 
Under Section 28 an employee is discriminated against if: 
(a) 
the employee's employer or a representative of that employer -
Refuses or omits to offer or afford to that employee the same terms of employment, 
conditions of work, fringe benefits, or opportunities for training, promotion, and 
transfer as are made available for other employees of the same or substantially 
similar qualifications, experience, or skills employed in the same or substantially 
similar circumstances; or 
366 Peter Kiely 
(b) Dismisses that employee or subjects that employee to any detriment, in 
circumstances in which other employees employed by that employer on work of 
that description are not or would not be dismissed or subjected to such detriment; 
or 
(c) Retires that employee, or requires or causes that employee to retire or resign -
by reason of the colour, race, ethnic or national origins, sex, marital status, or religious or 
ethical belief, or age of that employee or by reason of that employee's involvement in the 
activities of an employee's organisation. 
The grounds of discrimination under the Human Rights Act are wider than the Employment 
Contracts Act. Under the Human Rights Act the further grounds of disability, political 
opinion, employment status, family status and sexual orientation are made unlawful. On 
the other hand the Employment Contracts Act protects discrimination by reason of an 
employee's involvement in the activities of an employees' organisation - a ground missing 
from the Human Rights Act. 
Like the Human Rights Act, the Employment Contracts Act also provides remedies for 
sexual harassment (s.29). 
Remedies 
If an employee is found to have a grievance, the Employment Tribunal or Court has the 
power to award a range of remedies. These include: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
The reimbursement to the employee of the wages or other money lost as a result 
of the grievance; 
Reinstatement of the employee to their former position or placement in a position 
no less advantageous; 
The payment of compensation by the employer, including compensation for: 
(i) Humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to the feelings of the employee; 
and 
(ii) Loss of any benefit which the worker might reasonably have been 
expected to obtain if the grievance had not arisen; 
If the Tribunal or Court finds an employee to have been sexually harassed, 
recommendations to the employer concerning the action the employer should take 
in respect of the person who was guilty of the behaviour, which action may include 
the transfer of that person, the taking of disciplinary action against that person, or 
the taking of rehabilitative action in respect of that person. 
The Act also provides that in deciding on the nature and extent of the remedy to be 
awarded the extent to which the actions of the employee contributed towards the situation 
giving rise to the grievance should be taken Into account. 
The Employment Contracts Act provides no limit on the amount of compensation that can 
be awarded by the Tribunal for distress and humiliation. 
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Choice of procedure 
As indicated above complainants must elect which procedure they wish to follow. They 
may pursue either a personal grievance under the Employment Contracts Act, or a 
complaint under the Human Rights Act, but not both (s.39 of the Employment Contracts 
Act and s.64 of the Human Rights Act). · 
A factor that is presently relevant when deciding which procedure to invoke is that the 
remedies available under the two statutes vary. Section 40 of the Human Rights 
Commission Act currently provides that damages for humiliation and loss of dignity of the 
aggrieved person shall not exceed $2,000, whereas under the Employment Contracts Act 
the equivalent Section 40(1)(c) has no limit on the amount of compensation that can be 
awarded by the Tribunal for distress and humiliation. 
This distinction is all but gone under the new Act. The ceiling on compensation has been 
raised from $2,000 to the District Courts Act limit of $200,000. As a result, it would seem 
that the differences between actions under the Human Rights Act, and personal grievance 
claims under the Employment Contracts Act, will be minimal. Although as the Court of 
Appeal indicated in Telecom South Limited v Post Office Union Inc. ([1992] 1 NZLR 275) 
awards of the Employment Court in excess of $50,000 are "exceptional". 
Recent Cases 
There is no case law on the Human Rights Act 1993 as it is not effective until 1 February 
1994. It is therefore not possible to predict with complete certainty the approach that the 
Tribunal and the Courts will take under the new legislation. However, given that the new 
Act does not radically alter the present position, it is doubtful that there will be any 
significant change in approach. It follows that recent cases under the present legislation 
will be the guide. 
It is perhaps easiest to separate out each head of discrimination for discussion. Because of 
the similarities in the two pieces of legislation and the likelihood of similar results under 
each, the decisions of the two judicial bodies, the Complaints Review Tribunal and the 
Employment Tribunal, are considered together. 
Sex 
This ground of discrimination has given rise to some of the most widely publicised cases. 
The Equal Opportunities decision in Human Rights Commission v Air New Zealand ([1989] 
2 NZELC 96,614) was the first opportunity the Tribunal had to invoke the procedures of 
the Human Rights Commission Act. In the landmark decision in December 1988, the 
Tribunal foimd that sex discrimination had occurred because of the treatment of female 
cabin crew as compared to male cabin crew and in the ability of females to obtain the same 
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promotion as their male colleagues. The Tribunal found that the 17 female complainants 
had endured behaviour and incidents which ranged from indifference to extreme harassment 
of a sexist and at times racist nature and awarded compensation for loss of salary, 
opportunity and annual leave and damages for humiliation and loss of dignity. 
While the individual payouts to the women and the total amount of the settlement remained 
confidential, the company did agree to meet the costs of the Human Rights Commission in 
taking the case to the Tribunal. These amounted to $303,858. 
In Barry v NZ Fire Commission (Human Rights Commission, 28 January 1982) Mrs Barry 
applied to join the fire service and was turned down on the grounds that she was below the 
minimum height requirement. The Human Rights Commission found that there was no 
minimum height required, and that she had in fact been rejected because of the all male 
tradition of the service. Mrs Barry was subsequently appointed to fire fighting duties. 
A more recent case was Proceedings Commission v Armourguard Security Limited (21 
August 1991, EOT 13/90). Armourguard was held to have breached the Human Rights 
Commission Act because it would not employ women on armoured car and various other 
duties between the hours of midnight and 6:00am. Nor would it afford women the same 
terms of employment and opportunities for training, promotion and transfer as were made 
available to their male equivalents. It was held that women were subjected to detriment in 
that they were · precluded from work attracting higher pay. 
The Tribunal made orders restraining Armourguard from continuing the breaches and 
awarded damages of $5,000 in respect of humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings 
of the five female Armourguard employees. It also ordered that Armourguard implement 
and maintain for a minimum period of three years an equal employment opportunities 
programme, and required Armourguard to display a notice of its non-discrimination policy 
at all branches. Finally, a joint press release on the matter by Armourguard and the Human 
Rights Commission was ordered. 
The most recent case concerning this form of discrimination was Proceedings Commission 
v Howell & Anor (18 June 1993, EOT 5/93). The complainant, who had one pre-school 
child, had been offered a full-time position as a hotel manager. She accepted the position ~ 
but indicated that she would need a few days to make babysitting arrangements. 
Although the complainant thought the job was hers, the manager who had offered her the 
position had second thoughts after discussions with the owner of the hotel. The position 
was subsequently offered to another person apparently less satisfactory for the job. 
It transpired that the reason for the complainant's non-appointment was primarily because 
she was a woman with a young child. The hotel owner admitted that he did not feel that 
the post of hotel manager was suitable for a ~oman with a child. The owner argued that 
the complainant's non-appointment was c~used solely by her responsibilities as a parent, 
and not . because she was a woman. Discrimination on the grounds of parenthood is not 
illegal under the Human Rights Commission Act 1977 (although the Human Rights Act 
1993 now expressly includes pregnancy and childbirth within the definition of sex). 
However, the appointee to the position was a male who alsb had young children. This 
Discrimination and Human Rights 369 
tended to confmn that the complainant's failure to get the job was not because she had a 
child but because she was a woman with a child. 
Because there had been sexual discrimination, remedies involving compensation of almost 
six months' projected salary were granted, after a significant deduction for child-minding 
costs. The total was $17,388. 
Marital status 
A recent illustration of discrimination on this ground 1s provided by Proceedings 
Commission v NZ Post Limited ([1992] NZAR 111). NZ Post Limited had a voluntary 
severance scheme which provided for a payment related to wages, together with a smaller 
percentage payment for the employee's spouse ~d for ea~h depend~~ child. The 
complainant, who was not married and therefore did not receive the additional payment 
which married employees received, challenged the legality of the arrangement. It was held 
that it did amount to discrimination on the grounds of marital status since the complainant 
did not get the additional payment precisely because of his marital status, ie. the fact that 
he was not married. 
The Tribunal ordered that a declaration that NZ Post Limited had breached the Human 
Rights Commission Act be made. The complainant was . awarded $1,000 in damages for 
humiliation, $1,451 as reimbursement for his legal fees and $7,500 costs. 
Religious or ethical belief 
The leading case on discrimination on these grounds is Human Rights Commission v Eric 
Sides Motors ([1981] 2 NZAR 447). The defendant, a service station, advertised for a 
"keen Christian" to work in the garage. A young man answered the advertisement and 
during a telephone conversation was asked whether he went to church on Sundays. The 
applicant indicated that he did not and was told by the proprietor that it was no use coming 
for an interview. 
The case took a rather unusual twist insofar as the defendant proprietor staunchly and 
vigorously maintained that he had a right to employ only "keen Christians", and that if he 
was faced with a choice between two applicants, one of whom was a Christian and one who 
was not, he would always choose the Christian. However he maintained that on this 
particular occasion he made the decision not to employ the applicant because earlier in the 
conversation he had ascertained that the applicant had had a large number of jobs in 
relatively quick succession, and therefore appeared to be a highly unreliable and 
unsatisfactory employee. 
On the evidence before it, the Court found that it was not proved that the applicant's failure 
to attend church was an operative factor, and therefore it was held that this particular 
element of discrimination had not been proved. However, while his actions were found to 
be legally justified, the employer still suffered some expense because of the proceedings. 
Mr Sides found himself involved in two years of trouble with the press and the Human 
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Rights Commission, and was ordered to pay the Court costs of the complainant up to 
$4,000. 
Colour, race, ethnic or national origins 
The leading case in this area is Race Relations Conciliator v Marshall ([1993] 2 ERNZ 
290). The Defendant was a matron of a rest-home who was approached by an employment 
programme tutor about the possibility of employment for a student. Having interviewed 
the student, the defendant told the tutor that she found nothing wrong with the student, but 
that she was apprehensive about how her residents would react to waking up and seeing a 
dark face looking at them. 
The Complaints Review Tribunal found that work had been available for which the student 
was qualified and that the defendant decided not to employ the student because of her 
colour and its anticipated effect on the residents. Accordingly, it held that the defendant 
had breached the Race Relations Act 1971. The Tribunal awarded $1,500 compensation 
for the hurt and embarrassment that the student had suffered and the effect on her 
confidence in herself and her courage in seeking work. The Tribunal noted that the purpose 
of damages was to compensate the student, not to punish the defendant. An order was also 
made that the defendant provide a written apology to the student. 
Another case in this area is Human Rights Commission v McCarthy ([1983] 3 NZAR 450). 
The decision arose as a result of a complaint under the Race Relations Act, when 
employees of a clutch repair garage made particularly derogatory and racially offensive 
comments to a Samoan customer. The Human Rights Commission successfully brought an 
action against the employees, the managing director and the company. 
The Equal Opportunities Tribunal awarded the complainant $900. The managing director 
(the employee who had uttered the most offensive words) was ordered to pay $500, the 
company was ordered to pay $250 and the remaining $150 was paid by the remaining 
employee. Special damages for loss of the complainant's wages ($153.23) and costs 
($1 ,500) were paid by the defendants in proportions corresponding to their several liability 
for damages. 
Age 
This ground of discrimination has been the subject of much public attention, and is 
currently making up 44 percent of all enquiries and informal complaints to the Commission 
(Human Rights Commission Newsletter, September 1992: 2). The recent suggestion by the 
Commission that advertising for a "senior lecturer" amounts to discrimination on the basis 
of age has been the subject of much controversy. The Commission has also indicated in 
its publication Age Discrimination in Employment' -· Guidelines for Advertisers that they 
consider the following to be discrimimitory: 
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Driver: must have at least jive years experience. 
School leavers required 
Mature and experienced senior salesperson. 
Wanted, youthful and energetic person. 
Age is a relatively new head of discrimination, having been introduced by Section 3 of the 
Human Rights Commission Amendment Act 1992, and the first case under the new law has 
recently arisen. A public sector employer required two 60 year old employees to retire, 
purely because they had turned 60. In a settlement mediated by the Human Rights 
Commission the employees received compensation totalling $26,500. 
The new Act goes further than the present legislation by providing that, after 1 February 
1999, there will be no age limit beyond which employees can be required to retire. 
Whether or not an employee's services are retained will depend upon their ability to 
perform the job. 
Employee organisation involvement 
As discussed above, this ground of discrimination is not included in the Human Rights Act. 
Discrimination on this basis can only be remedied by using the personal grievance 
procedure under the Employment Contracts Act. 
An illustration of this form of discrimination is provided by Otago Hotel IUW v Shiel Hill 
Tavern Limited (27 June 1990, CLC 42/90). The complainant was dismissed having been 
the only employee to participate in a five day strike. The Labour Court held that the 
employer had discriminated against the complainant by reason of his involvement in union 
activities and that consequently the complainant's dismissal was unjustified. He was 
awarded $2,500 for humiliation, $2,500 for loss of benefits, $3,858 wage reimbursement 
and $500 costs. 
In New Zealand Merchant Service JUW v Taranaki Harbour Board ( 4 October 1990, WLC 
71190) the complainant, a dredgemaster, successfully claimed that he was not appointed to 
a higher position because the selection panel was biased. It was held that the complainant 
was discriminated against because of his union activities. The complainant was awarded 
$25,000 compensation for injury to feelings and $45,000 for loss of future earnings. 
In New Zealand Airline Pilots Association !VOW v Air New Zealand (([1992] 3 ERNZ 73) 
the grievant succeeded in claiming that he had been discriminated against because of union 
activities. He had applied for a standards (training) position in respect of a different aircraft 
type. The employer rejected this application for several reasons including the grievant's 
union activities, inability to contact him, excessive sick leave and perceived disloyalty. The 
grievant was engaged in award negotiations as a union representative. He was told by the 
employer that if he withdrew from his position as a union negotiator he could have a 
standards position. It was held by the Employment Court that this was just the type of 
action which the legislation prohibited. In so acting the employer had stepped over the line 
between acceptable managerial direction and discrimination. 
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The Court awarded the grievant $15,798 as lost remuneration and $10,000 compensation 
for being disadvantaged by the non-appointment because his future promotion prospects and 
remuneration increases had been delayed. The Court refused a compensation award for 
humiliation and distress because of the grievant's 11robust and resilient nature in dealings 
with the employer11 • 
Sexual harassment 
A recent illustration of this form of discrimination is provided by Fulton v Chi at Day Mojo 
Limited ([1992] 2 ERNZ 38). The applicant was employed as a receptionist. When 
employed she was warned about the 11off beat11 nature of the workplace sense of humour. 
During the course of her employment she was induced to page non-existent people with 
names which amounted to 11phonetic obscenities11 • She complained to her employer about 
this sexual harassment. The offending staff were spoken to about the behaviour and she 
was reassured that it would not be repeated. 
Soon afterwards the applicant was given a letter by her employer stating some concerns 
about her work performance. She noted that the sexual harassment had an effect on her 
work, and her employer suggested that she was over-reacting to a joke. She was asked why 
she continued with the job, and the following day she resigned. 
The Employment Tribunal held that the words complained of constituted sexual harassment 
as they were of a sexual nature, unwelcome and offensive and were detrimental to her 
work. However, as the employer had taken all practical steps to prevent the reoccurrence 
of such harassment the applicant had no personal grievance against the employer. 
It was held however, that the applicant was constructively dismissed since the employer 
made it plain that the jokes were amusing and remained amusing. By condoning the 
offensive behaviour, even after taking steps to prevent its reoccurrence, the employer 
effectively told the applicant that she ought to accept such behaviour. In such 
circumstances her resignation amounted to a constructive dismissal. The complainant was 
awarded $3,000 compensation and $1,250 costs. 
I 
In Proceedings Commission v New Zealand Van Lines Limited ([1993] 2 ERNZ 112) the 
grievant was employed by the defendant in one of its branches. Two co-workers subjected 
her to remarks of a sexual nature and one of the co-workers seized her by the breast on two 
occasiOns. 
The Tribunal found that the employer had not established a defence under Section 33(3) in 
that it had not taken such steps as were reasonably practicable to prevent the conduct which 
occurred. The employer had failed in its obligations to ensure proper supervision through 
its manager, and to ensure that a climate did . not exist which was likely to give rise to 
discrimination of the sort which occurred. Thus, the Tribunal awarded the maximum 
amount of damages of $2,000. 
It was also held that, while it was appropriate to .suppress the identity of the grievant, such 
an order should not be made for the employer. While publication of the company's name 
might have had an adverse impact on its trading reputation, the Tribunal held that 11that was 
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something the company had brought upon itself'. 
The employer is, in many respects, in a 11double jeopardy11 situation in respect of allegations 
of sexual misconduct. Not only must the employer be fair to the employee allegedly being 
harassed, but it must also be fair to the employee allegedly harassing. 
In B v NZ Amalgamated Engineering Union ([1992] 2 ERNZ 554) an employer dismissed 
an employee for misconduct following complaints of sexual harassment from two of his 
female work colleagues. The incident complained of was an exchange of words between 
the complainant and Mr B, followed by Mr B taking hold of the complainant around her 
shoulders, pulling her towards him and attempting to kiss her, or actually kissing her (the 
facts were in dispute). The words complained of were to the effect that Mr B had seen the 
complainant with another employee walking arm-in-arm and flirting madly. 
Mr B was put on notice of instant dismissal if the allegations were established. The 
employer undertook an investigation and concluded that the words used were of a sexual 
nature, the physical conduct was both unwelcome and offensive and that such conduct 
amounted to sexual harassment. Mr B was accordingly dismissed. 
The employee challenged his dismissal and the Employment Tribunal held that the conduct 
complained of did not amount to sexual harassment within the meaning of the Act. The 
conduct was offensive and contained a sexual dimension and may even have constituted 
indecent assault, but the Tribunal found that it had not been established that the conduct 
was of such a degree as to have had a detrimental effect on the complainant's employment. 
The dismissal was found to be both substantively and procedurally unfair. The Court 
further noted that even if the conduct complained of had amounted to sexual harassment, 
dismissal would have been an inappropriate form of discipline. This was because there 
were other options such as a final warning, counselling or opportunity to apologise and 
some or all of these would have been more appropriate. 
The Tribunal made no orders as to remedies. It recommended that Mr B be reinstated and 
adjourned the hearing to enable the parties to consider and agree upon the terms of 
reinstatement. 
A similar case is NZ Association of Polytechnic Teachers Inc v Nelson Polytechnic ([1991] 
I ERNZ 662) in which complaints of sexual harassment committed by a temporary tutor 
were made by students to a supervisor. The tutor was advised of the complaints, but was 
not told their nature. The supervisor then investigated the complaints with an independent 
committee. Despite the committee reporting that there was no justification to dismiss the 
tutor, the supervisor did dismiss him. 
The Court held that the dismissal was unjustified because the complaints of sexual 
harassment lacked detail as to time and place, and were insufficient proof of the alleged 
misconduct. The grievant was awarded substantial compensation for anxiety, distress and 
future economic loss of prospects of employment. This amounted to $30,000 for lost 
wages, $25,000 compensation for humiliation etc and $40,000 compensation for future 
economic loss. See also C v L D Nathan & Co Ltd ([1988] NZILR 304). 
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Standard of proof 
The correct standard of proof in a sexual harassment case is the balance of probabilities. 
The grievant has to prove that "but for" the sexual harassment the resignation would not 
have occurred. In Z v A ([1993] 2 ERNZ 469) the Court in a case involving a resignation 
as a result of sexual harassment indicated that what has to be proved to show a constructive 
dismissal is that there was a breach of duty by the employer, that the employee resigned, 
and that there was a causal link between the two. 
Penalties 
Human Rights Act 
Failure to appear before the Complaints Review Tribunal, following a summons, or a 
refusal to give evidence or to produce any relevant document, carries with it liability to a 
fine not exceeding $1,500 (s.113). 
It is an offence, to unlawfully or wilfully obstruct or hinder the Commission or a 
Commissioner, or to fail to comply with any lawful requirement, or to make a false or 
intentionally misleading statement. In such cases a fine of up to $3,000 may be imposed 
(s.143). 
Employment Contracts Act 
Any party who breaches an employment contract or breaches a provision of Parts II, III or 
IV of the Employment Contracts Act is liable to a penalty under the Act ( ss. 51-55). In the 
case of an individual the maximum penalty is $2,000. For a company it is $5,000. 
A penalty action for breach of an employment contract is commenced by the party affected 
by the breach in respect of which the penalty is sought (s.53(1)(a). This contrasts with the 
Labour Relations Act 1987 which required penalty actions to be brought by either the union 
or employer party to the collective instrument or in the case of a breach of the Act by the 
Labour inspector. Any penalty ordered is paid into Court and then to the Crown Bank 
Account (s.54). 
Because the parties are required to bring penalty actions at their own suit they are not cost 
effective particularly when the payment is made to the Crown and not to the individual 
although there is provision under the Act to pay a whole or any part of the penalty to any 
person (s.54(2)). An indication ofthe level of penalties imposed has been recently provided 
by the Employment Tribunal in1 Young v Ha~nui Farm (1985) Ltd (unrep., AET 288/93, 14 
October 1993) where the respondent employer had a penalty imposed in the sum of$150.00 
for failing to provide, upon request, a copy of the wage records relating to the applicant. 
Because of the quasi criminal nature of penalty proceedings the maximum penalty is 
reserved for only the most serious cases. The criminal burden of proof applies in penalty 
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actions. This effectively means that there are two proceedings, with different standards of 
proof required, possibly heard at the same time. The Chief Judge in NZ waterfront 
Workers Union v NZ Association of Waterfront Employers ([1989] 3 NZILR 210) doubted 
whether it was possible for the two proceedings to be heard at the same time. However 
section 140( d) of the Act which allows the Court or the Tribunal to give such directions as 
deemed necessary or expedient may well allow joinder to consider both proceedings at the 
same hearing. . 
Hi~:her awards? 
There is no doubt that the passing of the Human Rights Act has indicated a new 
commitment to the prevention of discrimination in New Zealand. The Act sends a clear 
message to both employers and the Courts that discrimination in the workplace is 
unacceptable and will be punished. The raising of the maximum amount of damages from 
$2,000 to $200,000 for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings certainly gives the 
Courts the power to be more severe in their orders. Whether the Courts do in fact raise the 
average award given to grievants remains to be seen. 
